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NATURAL PROVIDENCE (OR DESIGN TROUBLE) 
Michael J. Murray 
Recent work in Intelligent Design Theory (IDT) reopens a number of ques-
tions concerning the nature of God's providence over creation. Friends of 
IDT claim that their "explanatory filter" allows us to detect design empiri-
cally and that this provides a way to make appeal to supernatural design in 
properly scientific explanations while at the same time undercutting 
methodological naturalism. I argue here that the explanatory filter is fatally 
flawed, and that detection of detection of design would not undercut 
methodological naturalism in any case. Friends of IDT fail to see this 
because they adopt a Newtonian conception of natural providence, while 
failing to consider a preferable Leibnizian conception. 
I. Introduction 
The history of discussions concerning divine providence contains two dis-
tinct strands. The first strand concerns God's providence over those fea-
tures of his creation that directly concern human beings. Discussions con-
cerning foreknowledge and freedom, freedom and predestination, soterio-
logical election, etc. fall under this strand. In the sixteenth century, and for 
the latter portion of the twentieth century, this is the strand that has been 
most pronounced in Christian philosophical discussions of providence. 
However, while traditional theistic religions hold that God exercises provi-
dential control over human affairs, they also hold that God's providential 
activity has a wider scope, extending to the workings of all of nature. The 
Christian faith specifically holds that God's intentions and handiwork are 
not merely evident in those features of creation that centrally concern 
human beings, but throughout the whole of creation. This second strand 
held sway in discussions of providence in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, most notably in the disputes between Leibniz and the 
Newtonians. Recently, interest in questions regarding natural providence 
has resurfaced, and this resurgence is due in large part to the work in 
Intelligent Design Theory. 
Intelligent Design theorists contend that the deliverances of natural sci-
ence show us that much of the natural world can only be explained by 
appeal to intelligent design, and that this means that natural science must 
be willing to accommodate appeals to design. This position is distinctively 
Newtonian and, I think, mistaken. In this paper I want to show how one 
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can happily admit evidence of design in nature, while rejecting the claim 
that this has any implications for the practice of natural science at all. 
Rather, friends of Intelligent Design should favor a Leibnizian model in 
which design is perfectly compatible with thoroughgoing nomic regularity 
in nature, and thus with a form of methodological naturalism in scientific 
practice. 
II. Intelligent Design Theory 
In the last five years or so, advocates of so-called Intelligent Design 
Theory, or lOT, have argued that Christians need to take their beliefs about 
natural providence more seriously, and that when they do, this will have 
an impact on how they think about the workings of nature itself. Christians 
believe, they argue, that God is not one to create the universe and then 
leave it to its own devices. Christian commitments concerning miracles 
and prayer are sufficient to demonstrate that. Since God is intimately con-
nected with his creation, Christians are thereby committed to thinking that 
certain states of the natural world are brought about directly by the divine 
hand. Any such events, of course, are going to be ones which cannot be 
truthfully accounted for by appeal merely to natural entities and their 
native powers. All attempts to explain such immediately divinely caused 
states of affairs by appeal only to natural entities and their native powers 
will thereby end up either in frustration or error. 
Friends of lOT are, however, quick to point out that contemporary natural 
science is firmly committed to a policy of methodological naturalism in sci-
ence. Thus, in cases where God's activity has in fact played a role in causing 
states of nature, the contemporary scientist will, they claim, necessarily land 
in frustration and error. Christian scientists who are willing to countenance 
the hand of design in natural explanations will not be at such a disadvan-
tage. For these scientists' awareness of divine activity in the world leaves 
them open to the possibility that states of nature might not be explicable by 
reference to natural entities and their native powers. And if there are reliable 
empirical means for discerning when states of nature cannot be naturally 
explained, the Christian scientist will have a distinct advantage here. She 
will be able to defend an empirically grounded, scientific explanation for the 
phenomenon in question that does not end in frustration or error. 
lOT theorists thus commend such a program to the scientific communi-
ty generally, and to the Christian scientific community specifically. To that 
end, they have offered intriguing arguments for the claim that design can 
be discerned by empirical means and that in some cases, scientific explana-
tions that invoke design are vastly preferable to the best explanations avail-
able under methodological naturalism. 
However, and perhaps not surprisingly, lOT is not a monolith. A closer 
look at the work of lOT advocates reveals that they do not all understand 
lOT or its implications in the same way. The somewhat more than causal 
observer comes away with the impression that some claim a greater reach 
for lOT than others. In particular, defenders of the view claim that lOT 
demonstrates one of the following increasingly bold claims: 
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1) Intelligent design in the natural world, if it exists, is empirically 
detectable. 
2) The natural world exhibits empirically detectable intelligent 
design. 
3) The natural world exhibits empirically detectable intelligent 
design that can only be accounted for by direct intervention of a 
designing agent. 
4) The natural world exhibits empirically detectable intelligent 
design that can only be accounted for by direct intervention of a 
designing agent and this requires that science reject methodologi-
cal naturalism. 
Christian philosophers should and do exhibit a good deal of sympathy 
with the motivation and substance of IDT. Christian natural scientists, 
however, seem to exhibit a great deal of reticence about IDT and its pur-
ported relevance for scientific practice. 
In what follows I will examine three of the four claims above and con-
sider whether or not IDT advocates have given us good reasons to adopt 
them. Although I will ignore (2) here, I will argue that their work has 
given us good reason to adopt (1), but not (3) and (4). Instead, I will argue 
that even though IDT advocates have given us reason to think that design 
is detectable in nature, there are no possible empirical grounds that could 
lead us to endorse (3). Since, by their lights, endorsing (3) provides us with 
the only reason for seeking to dump methodological naturalism, we thus 
also have reason for rejecting both conjuncts of (4). 
TTl. The "explanatory filter" 
William Dembski has undoubtedly done more than any other friend of 
!DT to make the case for the empirical detectability of intelligent design. 
It will be important to layout Dembski's view here in brief. According to 
Dembski, there are only three general explanatory paradigms available 
when we aim to explain the existence of an object, event, or state of affairs: 
law, chance, or design.! Dembski characterizes the three explanatory par-
adigms as follows: 
To attribute an event to law is to say that the event will almost always 
happen given certain antecedent circumstances. To attribute an 
event to chance is to say that its occurrence is characterized by some 
(perhaps not fully specified) probability distribution according to 
which the event might equally well not have happened. To attribute 
an event to design is to say that it cannot plausibly be referred to 
either law or chance.2 
In some cases, Dembski says that the we attribute an event to law when we 
regard the event as necessary or, more cautiously, as the /I almost inevitable 
outcome of prior circumstances in conjunction with the laws of nature./I 
The point here is straightforward enough. If one were to stumble across an 
ornate naturally occurring scolecite crystal, one might think that they had 
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stumbled upon a masterful work of art. Consultation with a local geo-
chemist, however, would reveal that scolecite is the crystalline form of 
hydrated calcium aluminum silicate, and that such crystals form due to the 
fact that the lattice structure in the crystal represents the minimal energy 
state for hydrated calcium aluminum silicate in solid form. While it might 
look like such a remarkable structure requires intelligent intervention, its 
occurrence is almost inevitable given certain conditions and the laws gov-
erning crystal formation. 
What about an event which is not explained as the almost inevitable 
outcome of prior circumstances in conjunction with natural laws? Such 
might be the case for a) events which result from probabilistic laws (where 
the occurrence of the event in question is improbable), or b) events for 
which there is no underlying law-like regularity which governs the occur-
rence of such events. In these cases, Dembski claims we must first ask 
whether or not the event is complex. If not, then it is reasonable to con-
clude that the event is the result of chance. 
To illustrate, Dembski asks us to consider a scene from the film Contact in 
which researchers searching for extraterrestrial life receive a signal consist-
ing of pulses and pauses. Interpreting pulses as l's and pauses as O's, the 
fictional researchers find that an extra-galactic signal they received repre-
sents the prime numbers from 2 to 101 in base 2. In the film, this gives the 
researchers a strong motive for believing that intelligent design was respon-
sible for the signal. Yet, as Dembski points out, if the researchers had 
received a series of pulses and pauses yielding the sequencell0ll101111 no 
one would have thought this result worthy of an inference to design, even 
though this constitutes the first 5 prime numbers in base 2. The reason this 
shorter sequence is more reasonably attributed to chance than design is the 
lack of sufficient complexity. The string is too short to conclude with any con-
fidence that it results from anything other than chance. 
In cases where events are a) complex and b) not explicable as the 
inevitable outcome of conditions and laws, the appropriate explanatory 
inference depends on the sort of complexity involved. If I, in a moment of 
bad gamesmanship, throw a Scrabble game out of the window, the result-
ing arrangement of tiles on the ground outside will be complex and not 
explicable as the inevitable outcome of natural laws. However, no one 
could reasonably conclude that that arrangement of tiles was the result of 
intelligent design. Though an intelligent agent threw the game pieces, the 
arrangement might have just as easily resulted from the game box being 
blown off the windowsill as from being thrown. 
However, if you were to pass by my window and find the very same 
Scrabble pieces arranged in such a way as to spell out the sentence "WEL-
COME TO PENNSYLVANIA" you would be quite confident that this 
arrangement was the result of design. Though the arrangement of thrown 
pieces and carefully placed pieces both exhibit a high degree of complexity, 
the latter instances an outcome that we would regard as favored in some 
sense, whereas the former would not. Dembski labels such favored out-
comes "specified complexity." Thus, in cases of complex, non-nomically 
inevitable events, unspecified complexity is best explained by chance, 
whereas specified complexity is explained by design. 
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Dembski claims that his "explanatory filter" is nothing but an explicit 
and carefully formulated explanation of the sorts of ordinary reasoning 
processes we employ when explaining events generally. If we stumble 
across a large, perfectly pyramidal shaped structure in the Central 
American jungle (i.e., a pyramid), we are able to infer reasonably that the 
structure was intelligently designed since we can reasonably infer that 
such structures do not arise from inevitable nomic processes, and they 
exhibit a high degree of "specified complexity." 
In what follows I will raise two difficulties for the explanatory filter. 
The first concerns the detection of the specification of complexity which 
licenses the design inference. The second concerns the claim that events 
explained as the result of inevitable nomic regularities should not be 
regarded as designed. I will address the former in section IV briefly, and 
the latter in sections V through VIII in some detail. 
IV. Specified Complexity? 
When we are trying to determine if a complex event exhibits specifica-
tion, it is the pattern exhibited by the event that is the focus of attention. 
Dembski claims that a complex event exhibits specified complexity when 
the pattern the event displays is detachable. For the sake of clarity, note 
that it is the pattern the event exemplifies rather than the event itself which is 
detachable. Roughly, a pattern is detachable if we can construct the pat-
tern independent of our knowledge of the event which instances the pat-
tern. In other words, if the pattern instanced in the event is one we can 
derive only after becoming acquainted with the outcomes, the pattern is 
not detachable. 
Dembski illustrates this with a case in which an election official was 
convicted of tampering when it was discovered that in 40 out of 41 cases, 
he gave Democrats the privileged top spot on the ballot. Given our knowl-
edge of how elections work and the aims of a corrupt Democratic official, 
we can, without knowing any actual outcomes, know what a "cheating 
pattern" looks like. It looks like Democrats getting top billing every time 
(or nearly every time). If that pattern is a pattern we can "come up with" 
without consulting any actual ballots we would have a detachable pattern. 
More specifically, a pattern is detachable if we can" come up with it" via 
side information which exhibits conditional independence and tractability. In 
the election case, our side information consists of information about what a 
pattern of cheating by a corrupt election official would look like. Such side 
information is conditionally independent when we have access to it in a way 
that is independent of our knowledge of the actual election outcomes. The 
side information is tractable when we are able, using that independent 
information, to construct the pattern which the event displays. As we saw, 
the side information in the election case is tractable as well since we can 
construct "election ballot cheating patterns" from our knowledge of how 
cheating would be accomplished. 
Thus we have a recipe for discerning specified complexity. If the pat-
tern displayed by the complex event in question is detachable (i.e., can be 
derived from side information that is both conditionally independent and 
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tractable), then the event exhibits specified complexity and is designed 
(unless explained by "law"). 
The trouble with Dembski's account however is that too many, perhaps 
all, patterns end up exhibiting specified complexity. The reason for this is 
that if we help ourselves to the right side information, we can generate a 
host of detachable patterns that should be regarded as the result of chance. 
In the election case, we can specify all patterns of outcomes (Democrats on 
top 41 times, 40 times, 39 times, in all of their permutations) by simply 
using an algorithm which delivers every possible outcome of ballot place-
ment. That is, if my side information is an algorithm which will spit out a 
list of all possible placements of Democrats and Republicans on the ballot, 
then we will be able to specify any pattern by using side information (the 
algorithm) that is truly conditionally independent and tractable.3 
What we need here, no doubt, is a restriction on side information so that 
we can correspondingly restrict the range of patterns that will count as 
"specified." But how should we do that? The only way, it appears, is to 
have in mind in advance what sorts of outcomes are privileged, and then 
consider cases in which side information would yield these privileged out-
comes. Thus, in the case of the Scrabble tiles above, if the pattern of tiles is 
one that spells out a coherent sentence in the English language, it counts as 
specified. So, side information concerning the formation of coherent 
English sentences should be permitted. 
Unfortunately, this sort of exercise is futile. We were looking for a way of 
objectively determining which events exhibit patterns of specified complexi-
ty. But on the "restricted side information" strategy, this is silly. To restrict 
side information we must already know how to pick out specified complexity 
in the first place. Thus, rather than the explanatory filter helping us to figure 
out when there is specified complexity and thus design, the filters success 
requires that we already be capable of picking out design independently. 
How then should we (or rather, how do we) detect design among the 
occurrences of improbable outcomes? I am not sure. But I, like friends of 
IDT, am confident we can do it. Perhaps we should take a cue from the old 
fashioned design arguments which said that "specified outcomes" are ones 
that exhibit patterns that intelligent beings often purpose to bring about in 
the world. So, when events exemplify patterns which are useful or aesthet-
ically pleasing, we can regard them as likely to have resulted from design 
rather than chance. 
Peter van Inwagen has offered a principle in another context which we 
might be able to employ here as well. In considering patterns of fine-tuning 
in the cosmos, van Inwagen proposes that we might be able to distinguish 
improbable but unspecified outcomes from equally improbable but speci-
fied outcomes by using the following principle, slightly modified here: 
Suppose that there is a certain non-nomically determined fact that 
has no known explanation; suppose that one can think of a possible 
explanation of that fact, an explanation that (if only it were true) is a 
very good explanation; then it is wrong to say that that event stands 
in no more need of an explanation than an otherwise similar event 
for which no such explanation is available.4 
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On this principle, we look at events which exhibit patterns not explained 
by law and see if a plausible alternative (read "design") explanation can be 
given. If so, we should regard the event as likely designed. If not, we 
should regard it as a result of chance. Thus, if we see Democrats receiving 
top billing in 40 out of 41 elections, and we notice that the election official is 
biased towards Democratic candidates, we have a pattern that admits of an 
explanation which, if true, is a very good one (cheating). But when the pat-
tern is Democrats on top 21 times, RepUblicans 20 times, no such corre-
sponding good explanation can be found, and the pattern can, and should, 
be taken as random. 
The upshot of this first criticism of Dembski is that the explanatory filter 
as described is flawed, but not fatally so. We can still see a way of distin-
guishing chance and design, though the method of doing so is far less rule 
governed and objective than perhaps the friends of IDT would wish for. 
V. Nomic regularity and the Defeat of Design 
I tum now to a second problem for Dembski's explanatory filter. The 
above criticism focuses on the way in which Dembski distinguishes expla-
nations via chance and design. This criticism concerns the distinction of 
explanations via law and design. In describing Dembski's explanatory fil-
ter we have seen that the first node in the decision tree requires us to deter-
mine if the event is the (nearly) inevitable outcome of nomic regularities. If 
so, the explanation is law, not chance or design. If we can discern some 
law-like way that an event, even a complex specified event, comes about, 
this defeats the design explanation. Michael Behe, in his book Darwin's 
Black Box, makes this claim repeatedly in referring to the "irreducibly com-
plex" biochemical processes and structures he treats. He writes: 
How do we confidently detect design? For discrete physical sys-
tems-if there is not a separate route to their production, design is evi-
dent when a number of separate, interacting components are ordered 
in such a way as to accomplish a function beyond the individual 
components.5 
And later, 
We must also consider the laws of nature. The laws of nature can 
organize matter .... The most relevant laws are those of biological 
reproduction, mutation, and natural selection. If a biological struc-
ture can be explained in terms of natural laws, then we cannot con-
clude that it was designed.6 
Thus, for Behe, success at explaining an event via nomic regularities 
trumps design explanations. 
However, this seems to entail a claim that many IDT advocates deny, 
sometimes strenuously, namely, that appeal to intelligent design requires 
appeal to supernatural intervention in the course of nature. One cannot 
have it both ways. If my success at explaining an event's occurrence 
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through law-like processes undercuts a design explanation, then the pres-
ence of design requires that some events be caused in a non-nomically reg-
ular way, i.e., miraculously. This is simple modus tollens? 
Behe is not alone in such claims. Here, for example, is Phillip Johnson: 
If God had created a lifeless world, even with oceans rich in amino 
acids and other organic molecules, and thereafter had left matter 
alone, life would not have come into existence. If God had done noth-
ing but create a world of bacteria and protozoa, it would still be a 
world of bacteria and protozoa. Whatever may have been the case in 
the remote past, the chemicals we see today have no observable ten-
dency or ability to form complex plants and animals. Persons who 
believe that chemicals unassisted by intelligence can combine to create 
life, or that bacteria can evolve by natural processes into complex ani-
mals, are making an a priori assumption that nature has the resources 
to do its own creating. I call such persons metaphysical naturalists.s 
Although Johnson is not as explicit here, the point is the same. Natural 
entities, operating via their natural powers, are incapable of explaining the 
existence of the complex biological entities we find. Thus, explanation of 
such entities must require reference to supernatural intervention into the 
course of nature. 
Above I noted, however, that many friends of IDT deny that design has 
any such implications. Dembski, to cite one example, insists that even 
though we might be able to assert confidently that a designer is required to 
explain an event, this has no direct implications for the way in which the 
designer brought the event about. Dembski claims the question of whether 
an intelligent cause was involved, the detectability question, is independent 
of the question of how such a designer acted, the modality question. 
The point I want to stress, however, is that the detectability and 
modality questions are largely independent, with the ... answer to 
one question not necessarily affecting the correct answer to the other." 
And yet, in the same work, Dembski indicates that a sine qua non of IDT 
is that it appeals to divine interventions. In the following passage, 
Dembski is explaining the difference between IDT and naturalistic evolu-
tion, claiming, it appears, that the course of nature will have gaps in the 
former but not the latter: 
The first thing to notice is that naturalistic evolution and intelligent 
design both make definite assertions of fact. To see this, consider 
your own personal genealogy. Here you are. You had parents. They 
in tum had parents. They too had parents. And so on. If we run the 
video camera back in time, generation upon generation, what do we 
see? Do we see a continuous chain of natural causes which go from 
apes to small furry mammals to reptiles to slugs and slime molds to 
blue-green algae and finally all the way back to prebiotic soup, with 
no event in the chain ever signaling the activity of an intelligent 
NATURAL PROVIDENCE (OR DESIGN TROUBLE) 315 
cause? Or as we trace back the genealogy, do we find events that 
clearly signal the activity of an intelligent cause? There exist reliable 
criteria for inferring the activity of intelligent causes. Does the natur-
al history display clear marks of intelligence and thereby warrant a 
design inference, or does it not? To answer this question one way is 
to embrace intelligent design; to answer it the other way is to 
embrace naturalistic evolution. lO 
Perhaps one might think that these remarks don't force Dembski to hold that 
lOT requires divine intervention in the processes of nature. After all, he 
merely says that if lOT is correct, some event in the chain will "signal" the 
activity of a designer. Perhaps this just means that such activity is detectable, 
leaving the modality question still wide open. Yet a few pages earlier 
Dembski is clear that the earmarks of design in question cannot be seen if the 
natural causal nexus is uninterrupted. As a result, he claims, so-called theis-
tic evolution and atheistic evolution are identical in scientific content. 
Thus, it seems that lOT advocates might consistently hold that the 
answer to the detectability question leaves the modality question open. 
But the Explanatory Filter contradicts this, by holding that if the modality 
question yields a nomically regular answer, the detectability question 
must be answered in the negative. And this implies that if design is 
detectable, there must have been intervention. We now tum to see why 
this claim is deeply problematic. 
VI. Intervention and Deck-Stacking 
Imagine that I invite you and two other friends to my home for a friend-
ly game of high stakes poker. In order to insure the integrity of the game, I 
propose that we play each hand with a freshly opened deck of preshuffled 
cards. After five hands of five-card stud you grow suspicious. The reason: 
I have won every pot with a hand of four aces. 
Convinced that I am cheating, you set out to figure out how I have 
done it. You look up my sleeve, my pant leg, under my hat, all to no 
avail. It becomes clear to you that I did not break the rules by unfairly 
adding cards to, or removing cards from, my hand during the game. All 
attempts to discover signs of intervention during the course of the game 
come up empty. What should you conclude? Perhaps one might con-
clude that no rules of poker playing were violated during the course of the 
game and thus that there was no cheating after all. No contravention of 
the rules during the game, no cheating. 
One of the other losers is, however, not convinced by such reasoning. 
While it might be true that there was no cheating by intervention, there are 
other ways to manipulate the game to get the favored outcome. How? 
The answer is, of course, easily discovered in the neatly stacked pile of 
"new pre-shuffled" decks at the edge of the table. Upon examining the 
first, we notice that among the cards at the top of the deck, every fourth 
one is an ace. The jig is up! All I had to do is control certain initial condi-
tions, i.e., who dealt the hands, and I would be a guaranteed winner. 
Here we have a case in which the earmarks of intelligent intervention 
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are clear. It is reasonable for us to expect that no one would, just by 
chance, win five rounds of poker with hands of four aces. But there are 
two very different ways in which intelligent agency might have secured 
the result, by intervention and by deck-stacking. 
Notice two important implications of the distinction that I will return to 
later. First, the inference that we make that cheating occurred here (call it 
"the cheating inference") was made in way that was indifferent to our 
knowledge of how it was pulled off. It might be the case that someone 
looking at the game that we played would plainly see that no rules of 
poker playing were violated. The game was utterly "nomically regular." 
Nonetheless, the cheating inference would not be undercut. 
The relevance of this observation should be obvious. As we saw earlier, 
IDT advocates, most notably Behe and Johnson, argue that design infer-
ences are defeated if the processes that lead to the designed outcome are 
nomically regular. This is a mistake. Even if the designed outcomes can be 
explained by appeal to the regular operations of the laws of nature, infer-
ences to design can still be warranted. 
The second implication, the flip-side of the first perhaps, is that if all we 
had access to was the outcomes of the poker games, there would be no way 
in principle to discern whether or not the cheating occurred via deck-staking 
or intervention. So, if we imagine that after each hand, the players laid out 
their sets of five cards on a separate table, and one had access only to those 
final results, we could tell that the one player had cheated, but would have 
nothing to offer about whether deck-stacking or intervention explained it. 
This second implication is important because it helps us think through 
the relevance of design for the philosophy of science generally. As we 
have seen, friends of IDT offer arguments along the lines of the following: 
1) If design inferences concerning natural phenomena are warrant-
ed, then intelligent agency has played a role in bringing about 
some natural phenomena 
2) If intelligent agency has played a role in bringing about some 
natural phenomena, then purely naturalistic science will fail to 
explain truly such phenomena. 
3) If purely naturalistic science will fail to explain truly such phe-
nomena, then any methodologically naturalistic science will nec-
essarily ultimately lead to errant explanations. 
4) Any methodology that necessarily ultimately leads to errant 
explanations should be abandoned. 
5) Thus, if design inferences are warranted, methodological natural-
ism should be abandoned. 
Although the argument might look plausible on first glance, there is some-
thing deeply mistaken about it. And the cheating analogy makes clear that 
the trouble is premise 2. To see this we must consider first what the ana-
logue for methodological naturalism would be in the cheating case. The 
answer can only be that it is an attempt to explain the outcomes of poker 
games by appeal to the rules of poker play. Call this "methodological rule-
following." Can we explain the outcomes of the game described earlier by 
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adopting methodological rule-following? In one sense we can. That is, if 
the role of the explainer here is simply to explain what rules brought us 
from the starting point of the game (cracking open the deck) to the (appar-
ently designed) outcome, the answer is yes. Knowing the rules of poker 
would be sufficient to explain the outcomes in that sense. In another sense, 
of course, the explanation will be incomplete, since we have not explained 
every feature of the outcome about which we are curious, specifically, 
those features that tipped us off to the presence of cheating. 
This leads us directly to the question of what it is exactly that scientific 
inquiry is supposed to be doing. We will tum to this question below. For 
the moment I want us to take note of this point, namely, that the success of 
"law" explanations has nothing to do with cheating inferences or design 
inferences. This means, of course, that Dembski's explanatory filter 
requires further adjusting. As we will see however, the required adjust-
ment will force friends of lOT to abandon intelligent design as a paradigm 
of natural science inconsistent with methodological naturalism. 
VII. Design and Natural Science 
Critics of lOT have frequently replied that methodological naturalism 
either cannot or should not be abandoned in science. But why should 
there be such insistence on maintaining methodological naturalism? 
Assume, for a moment, that God did miraculously intervene in the course 
of nature to bring about the origin of life, or the origin of the first instances 
of distinct biological kinds, or the origin of (some or all) human beings? If 
the scientist were by fiat to be blocked from countenancing such causes, 
then scientific attempts to understand these phenomena would be doomed 
to frustration or falsity. How absurd for the Christian, if he or she is con-
vinced, perhaps by the contents of revelation, that God did act in just such 
a fashion, to reject the true explanation. How, on the naturalistic view, 
should the Christian scientist proceed when trying to explain scientifically 
the origins of natural kinds? Should she offer the best naturalistic explana-
tion available, knowing all along that while the explanation is the best sci-
entific one, it is nonetheless ultimately false? Why not rather drop such 
artificial, partisan barriers, and attempt to give the right explanation rather 
than the best "merely scientific" explanation or the best "merely theolOgi-
cal" explanation? 
One common reply to this question is simply that such explanations 
transcend the bounds of science properly construed. I think many 
Christian philosophers bristle at the suggestion that appeals to divine inter-
vention rule out an explanation as "genuinely scientific." That strikes too 
close to the little tolerated view that bringing God into, for example, philos-
ophy makes one's work not "genuinely philosophical." Why not rather 
say, as we do in philosophy, and as friends of lOT do concerning science, 
that we should lift such ad hoc restrictions, and let the chips fall where they 
may? If the best explanation for a philosophical problem requires appeal 
to the supernatural, so be it; and likewise in the case of science. This is just 
what lOT advocates are stumping for. 
So perhaps disciplinary territorialism should not rule out Intelligent 
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Design as a genuinely scientific explanation. But we are not out of the 
woods yet. For even though countenancing design as an explanation 
might in principle count as genuine science, it cannot if the design hypoth-
esis is not empirically distinguishable from explanations which appeal 
only to the natural powers of natural substances. If such empirical distin-
guishability is not possible, then there is no scientifically respectable way, 
by IDT's own lights, to defend intelligent design as an explanation distinct 
from law and chance. 
But why think that IDT advocates are stuck with this problem, a prob-
lem we might call the empirical vacuity problem? The answer, once again, 
can be found in the poker case above. If, 
a) one acknowledges that designed outcomes might in principle be 
explained either via deck-stacking or intervention and, 
b) we have no access to the actual sequence of eve~ts that led to the 
obtaining of the apparently designed outcome, Xl then, 
c) there are no empirical grounds for favoring explanations via law 
over explanation via design. 
The point becomes clear when we consider cases in which friends of IDT 
think design is empirically detectable. The two most commonly discussed 
cases are those concerning so-called cosmological fine-tuning and concern-
ing irreducible biological complexity. For reasons that will become clear 
shortly, I will focus on just the latter here. The details of the argument con-
ceming irreducible complexity are widely known and I won't repeat them 
here. Irreducible biological complexity is a notion introduced by Michael 
Behe in his widely cited work Darwin's Black Box. In the book, Behe gives 
numerous examples of microbiological structures and of biochemical 
processes which are a) complex, b) such that the function they perform for 
the organism is essential for the organism's survival, and c) such that were 
the structure or process to lack some of the parts it has, it would be unable 
to perform its essential function, rendering it, from the organism's stand-
point, totally non-functional perhaps even maladaptive. 
Since structures or processes which contain only proper subsets of the 
parts of the fully functional structure or process are non-functional, stan-
dard Darwinian models cannot explain these complex structures or 
processes. Standard Darwinism requires that such complex structures 
arise by gradual accretion of parts, accompanied by gradual improvement 
in adaptiveness. Thus, these irreducibly complex structures must have 
come into existence some other way. Given the complexity of the struc-
tures and processes in question, and the fact that the whole organism in 
which the structure or process is instantiated requires that structure or 
process to exist, it is incredible, claims Behe, that the process comes into 
existence by any other means than design. 
Behe's argument has generated a good deal of controversy. Most of that 
controversy has been with advocates of some variant of Darwinism argu-
ing that purely natural processes can account for such structures after all 
{either because such complex structures can arise all at once, or because 
precursors to the complex structure are not non-functional in the way Behe 
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contends). Consider, however, a different worry about Behe's argument. 
Earlier I noted that Behe asserts that if some nomically regular process 
were discovered which explains the origins of the irreducibly complex 
structures, this would provide a defeater for design. The cheating example 
made clear that this was a mistake. Since we do not have access to the actu-
al sequence of events which generated the irreducibly complex outcome, 
we cannot tell whether or not the process came about via intervention or 
deck stacking. Undoubtedly it would take a good deal of up front design 
work to insure that nomically regular processes would generate the irre-
ducibly complex outcomes Behe points to. But God is smart, omniscient in 
fact, and would no doubt be able to figure out how to secure such results 
through deck-stacking. 12 
And so we are compelled to admit that events which display the ear-
marks of design leave us in the dark about whether or not the chain of 
events leading up to designed event came about by intervention or purely 
nomically regular processes. The friend of lOT is, at this juncture, likely to 
reply that far from a surprise, this result is just what lOT has claimed all 
along. After all, doesn't Dembski himself distinguish between detectability 
and modality? No doubt he does. But this reply misses the thrust of the 
argument. The claim here is that designed events can be caused by either 
intervention or deck-staking-plus-nomic-regularity (or something more 
complex if indeterminacy is relevant; see note 12 for more on this). If all 
we have access to is apparently designed outcomes, we cannot distinguish 
between those that result via "law" (deck-stacking) and those that result 
from "design" (intervention). Thus, we cannot engage in the project sug-
gested by lOT advocates after all, namely, setting aside methodological 
naturalism and letting the explanatory chips fall where they may. The 
explanatory chips can't discriminate between these competitors. 
VIII. Objection and Reply 
Before proceeding further, let me pause to respond to a worry that may 
arise at this point in the dialectic. The friend of lOT may, at this point, 
object as follows: "Let's say that one does accept (a) and (b) above. You 
have claimed that in such a case one cannot empirically distinguish 
between cases in which an apparently designed event results from inter-
vention and from nomically regular processes. Surely this is false. For if 
that were so, it would mean that we could not decide whether or not the 
pyramids in the jungle are caused by law or intervention. But this is surely 
wrong. We are quite confident that pyramids result from design and not 
mere nomic regularity. And this shows that we have the ability to distin-
guish law from design after all." 
The imaginary critic is correct, except concerning what he takes the objec-
tion to imply. Of course we can see that the pyramids are designed. What I 
have claimed here is that we must admit that the design either arose via 
intervention or deck-staking. That is, either intelligent beings intervened in 
the course of nature to secure the designed outcome, or someone set up the 
universe from the beginning so that this otherwise unexpected arrangement 
of matter would arise through nomically regular processes. We favor inter-
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vention in this case (Le., the pyramid case) because we see that the outcomes 
(pyramids) serve the sorts of aims that intelligent human creatures typically 
have. Thus we have good reason to suspect that human creatures, and not 
mere nomically regular processes, caused them. But if someone could show 
us a time lapse video of universal history in which pyramids come to be via 
a nomically regular process, we should still conclude that this is a case of 
design, but of the deck-staking sort. 
So, a good reason (but not the commonly professed reason) why such 
explanations should not be favored in science is because there are no 
empirical grounds for favoring them over their methodologically natural 
competitors. Of course, if God were to privilege us with a revelation which 
filled us in on all of the occasions in which he directly intervened in natural 
affairs to bring about events that could not have occurred given the natural 
powers of natural entities alone, then the theist would be required to say 
that any explanation of the event (or its causal consequences) is incomplete 
without reference to divine causal activity. But absent this, IDT in its bold-
est form (the form described as (4) in section II) stalls. 
IX. Less Bold Versions of IDT 
In the remainder of this paper I want to consider two fall-back positions 
that friends of lOT might defend. Each provides a way of maintaining the 
integrity of design in science without falling into the greedier version with 
its errant methodological implications. What if, in light of the above, 
friends of lOT contend that we should scrap the explanatory filter, recog-
nizing that law does not defeat design in explanation after all, but still 
admit that, whether the designed event comes to be by deck-staking or 
intervention, a complete explanation will need to make reference to the 
activity of designer. And if scientists are honest seekers of complete expla-
nations of natural phenomena, they are still going to be obliged to take 
Intelligent Design seriously in their final rendering. 
There is a sense in which this fall back is clearly on target. Regardless of 
how the cheating occurred, intelligent agency is required in the complete 
explanation. Still, we can fairly ask at this juncture whether or not scientists 
are or should be concerned with complete explanations as described here. 
The answer is no. The reason for this is that when a deck-stacking explana-
tion is sufficient (and one always would be in these cases)13 scientists, theists 
or not, will be able to explain how the events came to be simply by appeal to 
the existence and activity of some set of theoretically postulated natural sub-
stances and their powers. To use Dembski's analogy, if we were to watch 
the time lapse video of universal history, nomic regularity would be pre-
served at each instant. As a result, it would be best for us to see the deliver-
ances of lOT as helpful natural theology, but useless science. Irreducible 
complexity or fine tuning might provide us with evidence of intelligent 
design, and thus with arguments for the existence of God. But they do not 
provide us with scientific explanations that compete with methodologically 
natural ones. As a result, the first fall back position will not take us where 
the friends of IDT want to go (though it might still be able to deliver some 
important and interesting results in natural theology nonetheless). 
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Perhaps the friends of lOT might avail themselves of one last ditch. 
Dembski and others have argued that the value of lOT lies not merely in the 
fact that it is better able than methodological naturalism to explain, say, irre-
ducible biological complexity, but that the lOT hypothesis is, in the sense 
employed by Kuhn, fertile or fecund. Thus, even if we were to drop the 
explanatory filter and the claim that complete scientific explanations must 
make appeal to design, we might still hold that belief in design might pro-
vide a useful background assumption when we are theorizing. Far from 
being a science-stopper, as God-of-the-gaps science is often claimed to be, 
lOT promotes fertile scientific theorizing. Thus, our belief that nature is 
designed might lead us to see the world in ways we otherwise would not. 
It is hard to know what to make of this suggestion apriori. Leibniz, no 
friend of divine intervention in proper science, argued that scientific specu-
lation that proceeds on the assumption of design was likely to be fertile in 
this way, though ultimate scientific explanations would not, he aruged, 
make reference to facts about design. His favorite example concerned 
Snell's Law, the law describing the behavior of refracting light (and electro-
magnetic radiation generally). Leibniz claimed that Snell was led to his for-
mulation of the law because it represents light as travelling by the path of 
least resistance. This makes sense from the design perspective and so pro-
vided a good place to start experimenting concerning the behavior of 
refracting light.14 
Friends of lOT have suggested some concrete ways in which the fertility 
of lOT might be manifest in contemporary science. Two recurring exam-
ples are: a) it might lead us to think that "junk" DNA has some important 
function after all and b) it might similarly lead us to look for the function of 
so called vestigial organs. is 
While it might be the case that approaching natural science in this way 
will sometimes yield fruit, the likelihood of red herrings runs equally 
strong. The reason for this is that lOT will provide a fertile theoretical back-
drop in a certain domain only if (a) we can be fairly confident of what the 
designer's intentions are in that domain, and (b) we are sure that the specific 
matter under investigation is relevant to those intentions. With respect to 
the first, we can imagine how far astray we might be led in the search for 
the function of vestigial organs if one of God's chief aims in constructing 
organ systems was aesthetic. Attempts to look for the functional utility pro-
vided by such organs would lead either to frustration or falsity. With 
respect to the second, consider the handle end of a plastic fork. Often, such 
forks will have a sharp burr at the end which is a result of the manufactur-
ing process. The fork could have been produced in a way so that this was 
absent. But all things considered, the manufacturer found it better suited to 
its aims to bring it about through a process that left this burr. These burrs 
have no purpose and serve no function. They are byproducts of a contin-
gent process of manufacture. And there is no reason to think that similar 
bypro ducts would be absent even from intelligently designed nature. 
Perhaps hairy armpits are an example. The point however is straightfor-
ward. Even Christians who claim to have a good bit of special revelation 
concerning God's purposes for the natural world have precious little of 
value when it comes to help with fertile scientific theorizing.16 
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X. Natural Providence 
Some have argued that there is something suspect about framing a view 
of providence in the way that the deck-stacker does, and that this should 
lead the Christian to favor interventionism. A deck-staking God is the God 
of deism. Christians, on the other hand, see a God whose direct handi-
work is evidenced repeatedly in the pages of Scripture and in the meta-
physical speculations of philosophers. Plantinga claims: 
First and most important, according to serious theism, God is con-
stantly, immediately, intimately and directly active in his creation: he 
constantly upholds it in existence and providentially governs it. He is 
immediately and directly active in everything from the Big Bang to 
the sparrow's fall. Literally nothing happens without his upholding 
hand. Second, natural laws are not in any way independent of God, 
and are perhaps best thought of as regularities in the ways in which 
he treats the stuff he has made, or perhaps as counterfactuals of 
divine freedom. (Hence there is nothing in the least untoward in the 
thought that on some occasions God might do something in a way 
different from his usual way--e.g., raise someone from the dead or 
change water into wine.) .... God is already and always intimately 
acting in nature, which depends from moment to moment for its exis-
tence upon immediate divine activity .... 17 
Likewise, Paul Helm argues in The Providence of God that deistic views of 
God as deck-stacker are inconsistent with Christian commitments to divine 
miraculous intervention and to the power of petitionary prayer. Helm 
describes the view as one according to which: 
[God], in creating the wuverse, creates it in such a way that he does 
not need to exercise a superintending care of it. This is the deistic 
view.1s 
Concerning petitionary prayer, Helm contends: 
According to the Christian faith, God answers petitionary prayer. 
That is, certain things happen in the universe because people ask God 
that they happen, and God is pleased to do what they ask. Had they 
not asked, the event in question would not have occurred; or at least, 
had they not asked, there is no reason to think that the event would 
have occurred. A deist, however, (at least if he is consistent) will find 
no place for petitionary prayer.19 
Other Christians have argued, on the contrary, that there is something 
unworthy of a theism which countenances a God who once creates the nat-
ural order and yet leaves it without the resources to bring about the 
desired results. The most vocal advocate of this line in the contemporary 
arena is Howard Van Till who argues: 
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I believe that the universe in its present form is to be seen as a poten-
tiality of the creation that has been actualized by the exercise of its 
God-given creaturely capabilities. For this to be possible, however, 
the creation's formational economy must be astoundingly robust and 
gapless-Iacking none of the resources or capabilities necessary to 
make possible the sort of continuous actualization of new structures 
and life forms as now envisioned by the natural sciences. The opti-
mally-equipped character of the universe's formational economy is, I 
believe, a vivid manifestation of the fact that it is the product, not of 
mere accident or happenstance, as the world view of naturalism 
would have it, but of intention. In other words, the universe bears the 
marks of being the product of thoughtful conceptualization for the accom-
plishment of some purpose.20 
Similar sentiments were staked out and defended with perhaps even more 
gusto in the past. Leibniz was aware of the fact that in the 1706 version of 
Query 31 of the Optiks Newton endorsed the claim that God on occasion 
directly intervenes to maintain nature's integrity. In particular, Newton 
claims that this was necessary to prevent the planets from falling in on 
each other. Leibniz, near the end of his life, seeks to provoke one promi-
nent Newtonian spokesperson, Samuel Oarke, on the matter. In the third 
paragraph of his opening letter to Oarke, Leibniz acerbically remarks: 
Sir Isaac Newton, and his followers, also have a very odd opinion 
concerning the work of God. According to their doctrine, God 
Almighty wants to wind up his watch from time to time: otherwise it 
would cease to move. He had not, it seems, sufficient foresight to 
make it a perpetual motion. Nay, the machine of God's making, is so 
imperfect, according to these gentlemen; that he is obliged to clean it 
now and then by an extraordinary concourse and even to mend it, as 
a clockmaker mends his work; who must consequently be so much 
the more unskillful a workman, as he is more often obliged to mend 
his work and set it right. According to my opinion, the same force 
and vigor remains always in the world, and only passes from one 
part of matter to another, agreeably to the laws of nature, and the 
beautiful pre-established order. And I hold, that when God works 
miracles, he does not do it in order to supply the wants of nature, but 
those of grace. Whoever thinks otherwise must needs have a very 
mean notion of the wisdom and power of God.21 
If one favors the sentiments expressed by Plantinga and Helm above, one 
might be inclined to break the empirical deadlock between deck-stacking 
and intervention in favor of intervention. If one were to favor van Till and 
Leibniz, one would likely be inclined in the opposite direction. In the end, 
however, the philosophical grounds for deciding this dispute may tum out 
to be no more useful than the empirical evidence (i.e., not at all). 
I am not sure how to defend the claim that the considerations appealed to 
by Leibniz are more persuasive than those appealed to be Plantinga. 
Nonetheless, I am inclined toward the deck-stacking model, and it is a model 
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which according to Helm, faces a pair of serious objections from miracles 
and petitionary prayer. Can the deck-stacker successfully respond to these? 
One might think that the challenge concerning miracles is rather easily 
met. In order to meet it one would first have to conceive of miracles in a 
way different than perhaps most Christians have, i.e., as violations of laws 
of nature. I think there are decisive independent reasons for jettisoning 
this conception of miracles, making any proposed reconception easier to 
swallow.22 On this alternative view, miracles would have to consist of 
arrangements of matter that were intentionally brought about by God via 
deck-stacking and nomic regularity, which arrangements would have 
been exceedingly improbable without God having stacked the deck in 
precisely the way that he did. Thus, though we all know it would be 
exceedingly improbable, it could be the case that all of the water mole-
cules in the Red Sea at the time of the Israelite crossing were such that 
their velocity and direction caused the parting of the Sea for just the 
amount of time needed for the Israelites to cross. Similar accounts can be 
given for miracles ranging from Elisha's floating axe head to Christ's res-
urrection. Still, it is an open question whether or not all miracles could be 
accounted for via deck-stacking.23 
Initially, it is hard to see how petitionary prayer raises any more trouble 
for the deck-stacker than it does for the advocate of complete foreknowl-
edge or robust providence over human affairs generally. In any of these 
cases, if God has middle knowledge, and thus knows what will in fact be 
prayed for in advance, God can determine that an event, X, will occur in a 
world at least in part because someone prayed for X to occur. 
It should be noted as well that Plantinga's arguments do not to pack 
any punch against the sort of deck-stacking view of natural providence I 
am defending here. Deck-stackers can heartily support divine conserva-
tion and the possibility for divine intervention into the order or nature if 
needed. 
But do the arguments of Van Till and Leibniz have any force for 
friends of deck-stacking? I think they do. For those who are not advo-
cates of divine openness, it is hard to see what motives God might have 
for electing to create the world and then later supplement his work, a lei 
Newton and Clarke, to bring about all of the aims he has for it. No 
doubt, universe creation and providential superintending of universes 
are tricky businesses, and perhaps no set of natural entities and powers 
could, through deck-stacking, bring off everything God intended for his 
creation to accomplish. But we cannot with any confidence at all pro-
claim that God couldn't bring about, say, all the arrangements of created 
things we now see about us through deck-stacking. Opponents of deck-
stacking will be happy to point out that we can't proclaim with any confi-
dence that He could do it either. 
And this brings us back to one of the central questions of the paper: 
Does any of this have any practical implications for the practice of science? 
At best I think the implication is this. If we cannot establish a preference 
for intervention over deck-stacking by empirical means (and we can't) or 
philosophical arguments (perhaps we can't) we should simply appeal to 
induction. God usually works by law-like means, so we should infer that 
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probably he does the same here and that if he did not, our ability to know 
that would be outstripped. Perhaps this just adds up to sound intellectual 
humility. To me, it sounds like methodological naturalism. 24 
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